

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
TRSE-00 /076 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2480

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 0604

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0539 (DTG 270854Z OCT 77)

FROM US REP MBFR

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BELGRADE ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

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USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE. ALL OTHER MBFR MISSIONS ROUTINE

AT ITS NOVEMBER 16 MEETING, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED IN
GENERAL TERMS THE OUTLINE TO BE USED BY FRG REP (BEHREND)
IN MAKING REGULAR AHG ORAL REPORT TO THE NAC NOVEMBER 18.
BEHREND WILL BE ASSISTED BY NETHERLANDS REP (DEVOS) AND

GREEK REP (CONTOUMAS). FRG REP WILL DRAW ON MATERIAL IN THE OUTLINE, NOT NECESSARILY USING IT IN FULL. UNLIKE WRITTEN REPORTS TO THE NAC, THE AD HOC GROUP DOES NOT UNDERTAKE WORD-FOR-WORD APPROVAL OF THESE OUTLINES, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED AS SPEAKING NOTES. THE TEXT OF FRG REP'S REPORT, ALONG WITH THE SAME ANNEX OF CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED IN CONNECTION WITH CANADIAN REP'S OCTOBER 28 REPORT TO THE NAC (REFTEL, FOLLOWS BELOW:

BEGIN TEXT: 1) SINCE THE LAST AHG ORAL REPORT TO NAC ON OCTOBER 28, 1977, THE ONLY INTERESTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE DATA BREAKDOWN. DESPITE A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT REACHED BY NOW WITH THE EAST ON DATA DISAGGREGATION, IT IS STILL UNCERTAIN WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE IN THIS ROUND TO EXCHANGE DATA ON THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN DISAGGREGATION PROPOSAL OF JULY 15 AND THE EASTERN RESPONSE OF OCTOBER 25. THE NEXT INFORMAL MEETING ON NOVEMBER 22 PROBABLY WILL SHED MORE LIGHT ON THIS QUESTION.

2) AS REGARDS TOPICS OTHER THAN DATA THERE ARE NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS TO REPORT. IT IS CLEAR THAT ON
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ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS TRY TO PLAY A WAITING GAME PENDING A NEW INITIATIVE WHICH THEY EXPECT TO BE FORTHCOMING FROM THE WEST.

3) LET ME NOW FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE PROBLEMS OF A DATA BREAKDOWN. ON NOVEMBER 9, THE WEST PRESENTED ITS ESSENTIALLY AFFIRMATIVE REPLY TO THE EASTERN COMPROMISE OFFER OF OCTOBER 25. THIS SPEEDY REPLY WAS POSSIBLE THANKS TO THE VERY EXPEDITIOUS ACTION OF THE SPC AND THE COUNCIL IN RESPONSE TO THE AD HOC GROUP'S REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE. IN THIS MEETING THE SOVIET DELEGATE IMMEDIATELY OBJECTED TO THE WESTERN STATEMENT THAT THE WESTERN BREAKDOWN PROPOSAL OF JULY 15 REMAINED ON THE TABLE, AND THAT THE WEST CONSIDERED IT LIKELY THAT FURTHER DISAGGREGATION OF DATA WOULD BE REQUIRED. HE INDICATED THAT THESE WESTERN STATEMENTS WERE CONTRARY TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE FUTURE DATA DISCUSSION TO THOS FIGURES WHICH THE EAST HAD OFFERED TO EXCHANGE IN ITS OCTOBER 25 PROPOSAL.

4) THE PRESENT STATE OF THE DISCUSSION AFTER THE

INFORMAL MEETING OF NOVEMBER 15 IS AS FOLLOWS:

-) IN THAT MEETING THE EAST DEMANDED THAT FUTURE
DATA DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE EASTERN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL OF

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OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
TRSE-00 /076 W

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O R 170953Z NOV 77
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2481
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0604

OCTOBER 25. THIS COMPROMISE REQUIRED THAT
PREVIOUS PROPOSALS SUCH AS THE WESTERN PROPOSAL
OF 15 JULY AND THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE
NATIONAL TOTALS WOULD BE DROPPED. THE EASTERN
NEGOTIATIONS, HOWEVER, STATED THAT THEY DID NOT
CONTEST THE RIGHT OF WESTERN NEGOTIATORS TO ASK
QUESTIONS AND THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE
PRECONDITIONS TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE DATA
DISCUSSION. THEY MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY
WOULD NOT ANSWER QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE
NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

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OF MAJOR FORMATIONS. THE WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAVE REPLIED THAT THEIR JULY 15 PROPOSAL WOULD REMAIN ON THE TABLE, THAT THE WEST COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO COMMIT ITSELF TO ABSTAIN FROM REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON EASTERN FORCES, THAT THE RIGHT OF EITHER SIDE TO PUT QUESTIONS COULD NOT BE LIMITED AND THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT ACCEPT AND WAS ITSELF NOT ASKING FOR PRECONDITIONS. THE EAST DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER ON THESE WESTERN STATEMENTS, BUT IT IS NOT CERTAIN YET THAT THEY WILL NOT RETURN TO THESE ISSUES.

B) CONCERNING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE AVERAGE MANNING LEVEL FIGURES, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS STATED THAT THE WEST WAS STUDYING THIS PROPOSAL.

C) IN REPLY TO EASTERN QUESTIONS WHEN THE WEST WOULD BE READY TO TABLE AIR FORCE DATA WESTERN NEGOTIATORS STATED THAT THEY DID NOT INSIST THAT DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE DATA BE CONCLUDED BEFORE AIR FORCE MANPOWER COULD BE EXCHANGED. THE WEST ENVISAGED THE TIME BETWEEN THE TABLING OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DATA AND THE TABLING OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER DATA AS A PERIOD OF SEVERAL WEEKS. THIS MIGHT MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO EXCHANGE AIR MANPOWER DATA ON AN AGREED BASIS BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND.

D) THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS STATED THAT FOR TECHNICAL REASONS THEY WERE UNABLE TO DISAGGREGATE THEIR AIR FORCE DATA IN THE SAME WAY AS GROUND FORCE DATA. THE WEST ITSELF HAD HITHERTO NOT BEEN ABLE TO SUGGEST A FORMULA FOR THIS DISAGGREGATION. AGREEMENT ON THE METHOD OF PRESENTING AIR FORCE

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DATA WAS REQUIRED BEFORE GROUND FORCE DATA WERE EXCHANGED IN ORDER TO PREVENT A POSSIBILITY INDEFINITE DELAY IN THE EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE DATA. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS STATED THAT THIS SEEMED TO BE A NEW DEMAND NOT PRESENTED ON OCTOBER 25. IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO SETTLE THIS ISSUE. THEREFORE IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO DELAY THE EXCHANGE OF GROUND FORCE DATA.

E) THE EAST ASKED FOR A SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE OF GROUND FORCE AND AIR FORCE DATA. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS CONTRARY TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL AS EXPLAINED ON OCTOBER 25. THE EAST HAS GIVEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT THEY MAY NOT PERSIST IN THIS DEMAND PROVIDED THAT THE ISSUE OF THE MODALITIES OF THE AIR FORCE DATA EXCHANGE CAN BE RESOLVED.

5. THE REASON FOR THIS APPARENT STIFFENING OF EASTERN DEMANDS IS NOT CLEAR. IT MAY BE AN EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THE PREDOMINATING WESTERN INTEREST IN A DATA DISAGGREGATION TO EXTRACT AS MANY CONCESSIONS FROM THE WEST AS POSSIBLE. IT MAY ALSO BE THE RESULT OF AN INCOMPLETE AND MISLEADING EASTERN PRESENTATION OF THEIR PROPOSAL ON OCTOBER 25.

6. IN THE VIEW OF THE AHG THE PREVAILING DISAGREEMENT ON THE METHOD OF PRESENTING AIR FORCE DATA IS THE MAIN AND POSSIBILITY THE ONLY SERIOUS OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF PROCEEDING TO AN EXCHANGE OF DISAGGREGATED GROUND FORCE DATA.

7. UNLESS AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT IS REACHED WITH THE EAST SOON IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY DATA DISAGGREGATION COULD TAKE PLACE IN THIS ROUND. THE

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TRSE-00 /076 W

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O R 170953Z NOV 77
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2482
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
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WESTERN POSITION IS THAT AN EXCHANGE OF AIR FORCE DATA SHOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER EXCHANGE AND DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE DATA. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EAST DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WILLING TO PROCEED TO AN EXCHANGE OF GROUND FORCE DATA UNLESS IT HAS THE CERTAINTY THAT AIR FORCE DATA WOULD BE EXCHANGED BEFORE THE END OF THIS ROUND. DEPENDING ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, THIS SITUATION MAY REQUIRE RAPID GUIDANCE FROM THE COUNCIL.

CONTINGENCY ANSWERS ON WESTERN INITIATIVE
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1. Q. DO WESTERN NEGOTIATORS CONSIDER THE EAST MAY MOVE IN VIENNA ON ITS OWN UNLESS THE WEST TAKES THIS FURTHER INITIATIVE?

A. (1) IT SEEMS HIGHLY UNLIKELY AND AT BEST DOUBTFUL. THE TALKS HAVE BEEN DEADLOCKED FOR SOME TIME AND WE SEE LITTLE PROSPECT NOW OF EASTERN MOVEMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

(2) IT IS A MATTER OF RECORD THAT TWO OF THE EAST'S MAIN CRITICISMS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH OVER THE PAST YEAR AND MORE HAVE BEEN FIRST, THE RELUCTANCE OF THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE A BINDING COMMITMENT IN PHASE I AS TO TIME AND AMOUNT OF THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS, AND SECOND, THAT THE WESTERN DEMAND FOR THE PHASE I WITHDRAWALS OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY WITH ALL ITS ARMAMENTS WAS HIGHLY INEQUITABLE AS WELL AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE WESTERN CLAIM THAT ITS PROGRAM FOR ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS WAS A SELECTIVE ONE. THE FRG INITIATIVE WILL ADDRESS BOTH THESE POINTS.

2. Q. WHY NOT WAIT UNTIL THE EAST AGREES ON DATA BEFORE MAKING THIS INITIATIVE?

A. THE FRG PROPOSALS ARE EXPLICITLY DEPENDENT ON EAST/WEST AGREEMENT ON MANPOWER DATA. IN THE VIEW OF THE AD HOC GROUP, THE EAST IS UNLIKELY TO MOVE TO REVISE ITS DATA

UNLESS THERE IS SOME MOVEMENT IN OTHER FIELDS.

3. Q. WHEN WOULD THE AHG THINK IT DESIRABLE TO
ADVANCE THIS INITIATIVE? DOES THE AHG HAVE ANY IDEAS
ON TIMING?

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A. (1) WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE FACT THAT THE WEST
IS EXPECTED TO MAKE AN INITIATIVE HAS RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE
SPECULATIVE PUBLICITY IN THE PRESS. GIVEN THIS FACT, IT
IS UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THE EAST TO MAKE IMPORTANT
MOVES ON SUBSTANCE UNTIL IT KNOWS WHAT THE EST MAY PROPOSE.
THIS MEANS IN PRACTICAL TERMS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL
LIKELY REMAIN DEADLOCKED UNTIL WESTERN INTENTIONS ARE
CLARIFIED.

(2) ONE SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE IMPACT
OF THE WESTERN INITIATIVE WILL BE REDUCED THE MORE
PUBLICITY IT RECEIVES.

(3) ONE SHOULD ALSO KEEP IN MIND THAT THE EAST
WILL PROBABLY TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIVE
RESPONSE.

4. Q. WOULDN'T THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW WESTERN
INITIATIVE NOW, IN THE FACE OF CONTINUED RECALCITRANCE ON
DATA, APPEAR TO QUOTE REWARD UNQUOTE THE EAST'S UNACCEPTABLE
BEHAVIOR AND SIMPLY ENCOURAGE THEM TO DIG IN ALL THE DEEPER,
BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT FURTHER RECALCITRANCE WILL BRING
STILL FURTHER WESTERN CONCESSIONS?

A. ALL I CAN SAY TO THIS IS THAT THIS INITIATIVE
IS SUCH THAT IT WOULD PLACE THE WEST IN A STRONG TACTICAL
POSITION TO PRESS THE EAST FOR A RESPONSE OF SUBSTANTIVE
CHARACTER.

5. Q. WHAT IS THE LIKELY EASTERN REACTION TO A WESTERN
INITIATIVE ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED?

A. WE THINK THAT THE EAST WILL MAKE A RESPONSE WHICH
ADDRESSES THE SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED IN THE WESTERN PAPER.
THIS WILL AT A MINIMUM RESULT IN CLARIFICATION OF SOME OF THE
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MAIN CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHETHER THE

EASTERN RESPONSE WILL GO FAR ENOUGH TO BRING A DECISIVE
TURN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE PREDICTED NOW. END TEXT.
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Message Attributes

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